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DISTINGUISHED FROM 'PUFFING" OR
"SELLERS TALK" IN OFFENSES
UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1341.*
I. INTMODUOTON
Perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a fraud on the pub-
lic by use of the United States mail is made a criminal offense
by 18 U.S.C. § 1341.1 The basis of this offense is "false or fraud-
ulent pretenses, representations or promises"2 by the defendant.
The courts are in general agreement that there are at least two
elements3 to the crime of mail fraud.4 In GoZd v. United States,5
the court said:
The essential elements of an offense under the mail
fraud statute are (1) a scheme conceived by appellant
for the purpose of defrauding ... by means of false
* United States v. Hannigan, 303 F. Supp. 750 (D. Conn. 1969).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964). This section provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to
sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply,
or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious
coin, obligation, security, or other article or anything represented
to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious
article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or
attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized deposi-
tory for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Post Office Department, or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the
place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom
it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
2. Id.
3. A third element has been mentioned by the courts at least twice, United
States v. Rabinowitz, 327 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1964); United States v. Baren,
305 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1962), but has not been accepted in later cases. This
third element and how and why later courts distinguish it are examined later
in this comment. See text accompanying note 47 infra.
4. Gold v. United States, 350 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1965); Beck v. United
States, 305 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962);
Dranow v. United States, 307 F2d 545 (8th Cir. 1962); Palmer v. United
States, 229 F2d 861 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 996 (1956);
Webb v. United States, 191 F2d 512 (10th Cir. 1951).
5. 350 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1965).
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pretenses, representations or promises, and (2) use of
the United States mails in furtherance of that scheme."
The requirement of a fraudulent scheme is the essence of mail
fraud, and proof of such requires distinguishing between inno-
cenf exaggerations, which have come to be called "puffing," and
actual, fraudulent misrepresentations.
In United States v. Hannigan,7 the court was required to
distinguish between "puffing" and actual fraudulent misrepre-
sentations. There the defendants had made representations as to
the price for which certain camera equipment sold on the open
market. Such representations were found to be false, and the
court upheld their convictions under section 1341.8 The court
acknowledged that "puffing" is not actionable under the stat-
ute,9 but found that the defendants had gone beyond mere
"puffing" and were guilty of fraudulent misrepresentations.
To understand the distinction which courts have made be-
tween "puffing" and actual fraudulent misrepresentations, cases
arising under the statute must be examined. Such examination,
accompanied by a factual study of Hannigan, will show how
and why such differentiation has developed and some of the
other problems that.arise in cases under section 1341.
II. "PurFINGn" v. Fn uADULNT nAisREPREsENTATIONs:
EVOL=OWT OF THE CONCEPT
An understanding of what constitutes fraud within the pur-
view of section 1341 is necessary since fraud arises in areas of
the law other than in the criminal mail fraud area. Such under-
standing is also needed because of the courts' use of common law
fraud by analogy in mail fraud cases.
Hannigan follows the rule, generally stated in other mail
fraud cases,' 0 that mail fraud is at least as broad as common
6. Id. at 956.
7. 303 F. Supp. 750 (D. Conm 1969).
8. The Hannigan court used a subjective-objective test to determine whether
or not statements of price could be considered fraudulent. Such test is exam-
ined thoroughly later in this comment. See text accompanying note 37 infra.
9. 303 F. Supp. at 753.
10. E.g., United States v. Whitmore, 97 F. Supp. 733 (S.D. Cal. 1951);
United States v. Buckner, 108 F2d 921 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 309 U.S.
669 (1940); Foshay v. United States, 68 F.2d 205 (8th Cir. 1933), cert.
denied, 291 U.S. 674 (1933).
19701
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law fraud.11 In United States v. WhitmnoTe,12 which was a mail
fraud case, the court said;
In the application of these principles [of mail fraud],
it may be said generally, that courts consider that
whatever would be fraudulent by common law princi-
ples is a scheme to defraud under the statute. 13
By following this line of thought, the courts are thus able to use
common law fraud cases by analogy in criminal mail fraud
cases.14 This is especially convenient for a court when drawing
the line between "puffing" and actual fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions since the distinction is also recognized in the common law
cases.1
5
Since the scope of fraud under section 1341 "is at least as
broad as common law fraud,"' the concept and application of
what constitutes "puffing" at common law must now be exam-
ined. Legal recognition of the trader's habit of and right to add
luster to his products is of long standing. In 1890 in United
States v. Staples,17 Judge Severens recognized this practice in
his charge to the jury and at the same time enunciated clearly
what then constituted "puffing." In Staples, the defendant had
duped the public by advertising wild huckleberry bushes as
cultivated "blueberry" plants. These huckleberry bushes were
actually sent to purchasers, but they died shortly after planting.
In charging the jury, Judge Severens said:
Now, gentlemen, you are familiar, as the public gen-
erally are, with the fact that seedsmen and nursery-
men, as well as other parties who have anything to
11. 303 F. Supp. at 754, citing, United States v. Whitmore, 97 F. Supp. 733
(S.D. Cal. 1951).
12. 97 F. Supp. 733 (S.D. Cal. 1951). The defendant here was convicted for
fraudulently representing what must have been average, or perhaps below
average, Christmas tree ornaments as, "the most sensational Christmas tree
ornament package of all time" and promised "85 out-of-this-world, colorful,
glittering ornaments that will make your tree the talk of the neighborhood."
Id. at 734.
13. Id. at 735.
14. The converse of this seems to be true also as McNabb v. Thomas, 190
F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951), in handling the
problem presented by statements of value in advertising, relies on statements
by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Rowe, 56 F2d 747 (2d Cir.
1932), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 554 (1932), a mail fraud case.
15. McNabb v. Thomas, 190 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 859 (1951); Aron v. Mid-Continent Co., 143 Neb. 87, 8 N.W2d 682
(1943).
16. United States v. Hannigan, 303 F. Supp. 750, 754 (D. Conn. 1969).
17. 45 F. 195 (W.D. Mich 1890).
[Vol. 92
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sell, have the habit of puffing their wares, and we are
all familiar with the fact that it is a very prevalent
thing in the course of business to exaggerate the merits
of goods people have to sell; and within any proper
reasonable bounds such a practice is not criminal....
A certain degree of praise and commendation of one's
goods in business is allowable; but when that is car-
ried to the extent of obtaining the public's money by
means of actually fraudulent representations, then it
comes under the condemnation of the law.'
8
The jury found that Staples had exceeded the bounds of "puff-
ing" in regard to his advertisements pertaining to "blueberry"
plants.
Leeway is granted to the seller in glorifying his wares even
though the statute's purpose has been said to be, "[To protect
the gullible, the ignorant and the over-credulous .... 19 A sales-
man should not be held to insure that everything he says about
his product is one hundred percent true. As section 1341 says,
20
and as later cases have pointed out,2 1 there must be a scheme to
defraud. Where the allegedly fraudulent statements are inno-
cent exaggerations, no such scheme can be found. Inherent in a
scheme to defraud is an intent to defraud. If the seller is merely
overzealous in extolling his wares, he should not be held to
criminal liability. It has been said, "The 'schemes' which have
been punished have all smacked of the confidence game; of
getting something for nothing."2 2 While in most schemes the
purchaser does receive something for his money, it is usually far
from what he expected to receive based on what advertisements
for the products have alleged. According to lVhitmore:
A purchaser is entitled to receive what he has been
led to believe he would receive. He is defrauded if the
promised expectations do not materialize. 23
Thus, while a seller is not held to making statements one hun-
dred percent true, he cannot make statements which will mis-
18. Id. at 198.
19. United States v. Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96, 105 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 943 (1952).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964), [based on 18 U.S.C. § 338 (1940)]. "Whoever,
having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud... 
21. United States v. Rabinowitz, 327 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1964); United States
v. Baren, 305 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1962); Beck v. United States, 305 F.2d 595
(10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962) ; Dranow v. United States,
307 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1962).
22. Harrison v. United States, 200 F. 662, 666 (6th Cir. 1912).
23. 97 F. Supp. at 735.
19701
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss3/8
SOUTH CARoLwNA LAW REvIW
lead the public into believing that they are buying something
which they are in fact not.
There is no distinct line between "puffing" and fraudulent
misrepresentations, and therein the problem lies. The problem
arises both in the area of statements concerning an article's
virtues and in the area of statements concerning an article's
value.
III. "PUNTING" v. FRAUDULENT MISxaEPREsENTATIoNS:
STATEKEMNTS OF A PRODUCT'S ATTuBTEs
Cases dealing with whether or not certain statements made
by a defendant concerning the virtues of his product constitute
fraud within section 1341 have arisen numerous times. Such
cases often present examples of blatant misrepresentations,
while at other times they present questions of making fine
distinctions as to whether or not statements are to be considered
fraudulent or "puffing."
United States v. New South Fa m and Home24 and Deaver v.
United States25 present some of the more blatant examples of
attributing virtues to one's product which they do not in fact
have. New South Farm and Home dealt with the problem of the
sale of Florida land through the mail. The printed material sent
out through the mail by the defendant extolled the grandiose
virtues of the land which was for sale. The land was purported
to be swarming with new residents, was said to have a year-
round growing season, and was portrayed as a virtual paradise.
The land turned out to be somewhat less than a paradise and
much of what was said in the mailed circulars was found in
fact to be false. New South Farm and Home's defense was that
such statements were merely "puffing." The district court
agreed with this, but the United States Supreme Court found
otherwise. In doing so, the Supreme Court said:
[Mere puffing, indeed, might not be within its
[the statute's] meaning ... that is, the mere exaggera-
tion of the qualities which the article has; but when a
proposed seller goes beyond that, assigns to the article
qualities which it does not possess, does not simply
magnify in opinion the advantages which it has, but
invents advantages and falsely asserts their existence,
24. 241 U.S. 64 (1916).
25. 155 F2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 766 (1946).
[Vol. 2.2
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he transcends the limits of "puffing" and engages in
false representations and pretenses.26
Deaver dealt with a scheme whereby the defendant offered to
exchange burial plots near Washington, D. C., for securities that
had greatly depreciated during the thirties. The market for
these plots was held out to be exceedingly good since burial
space in the area was at a minimum, various fraternal orders
wished to purchase the plots, and large scale plans for redevel-
opment were being drawn.27 Here, as in New Sout~h Farm and
Home, the court found such representations to be in fact false
and punishable under section 1341.
The allegedly fraudulent statements in Harrison V. United
States28 were of the type that present a border line question of
whether such are "puffing" or not. The statements there were
concerned with the ability, ease of handling, and work saving
qualities of the defendant's washing machine and vacuum
cleaner. The court quoted what Judge Severens had said in his
charge to the jury in Staples concerning "puffing" and sellers'
tendency toward such.29 Harrison, however, proved to the court
that most of what he had said his product could do, it could in
fact do, and his conviction was reversed and remanded.
United States v. BarenP° also presented allegedly fraudulent
statements which gave the court a little more trouble than the
blatant examples in New Soth Farm and Home and Deaver.
Baren did not fare quite as well as Harrison; his conviction was
upheld even though he proved that much of what he said about
his product (a knitting machine) was true. In fact the Govern-
ment acknowledged that the machine was effective, but based its
case simply on the fact that it did not live up to its advertised
standards and that purchasers had made their purchases of
these knitting machines on the basis of the representations in
the defendant's advertising.8'
IV. "Pur:NG" v. FRAUDUIENT M-ISREPRESENTATIONS:
STAT rNTS OF A PRODUCT'S VAL E
In Hannigan, the defendants contended that statements as to
a product's value can never be fraudulent, but are always
26. 241 U.S. at 71.
27. 155 F2d at 742.
28. 200 F2d 662 (6th Cir. 1912).
29. Id. at 666, quoting from 45 F. at 198.
30. 305 F2d 527 (2d Cir. 1962).
31. Id. at 529.
1970]
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"puffing" since they are statements of opinion.82 They asserted
that the statement of a subjective fact, such as a product's value,
is only the seller's opinion, and is to be considered "puffing",
and can never be considered fraud.
Hannigan, along with others, was prosecuted for mail fraud
under section 1341 and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371.33 The
scheme against which prosecution was sought dealt with the
advertisement of an offer for sale of color film. The advertise-
ments offered a package deal whereby the purchaser bought six-
hundred rolls of color film at a "reduced cost" of $1.00 a roll
and agreed to let the defendants process the film for the regu-
lar processing cost.3 4 For doing this the purchaser was to re-
ceive free a projector which the advertisements said would sell
on the open market for between $175.00 and $225.00 and a cam-
era which would allegedly sell on the open market for $150.00.
In actuality the projector and the camera were already being
sold on the open market for $99.50 and approximately $50.00
respectively. Thus, the purchaser was led to believe that he was
getting for free, a package deal worth between $500 and $600,
when in fact it was worth approximately $280.
The defendants contended that the statements as to the value
of the equipment were "puffing" and not actionable under the
statute. The court said, however, that the defendants had gone
beyond "mere exaggerations of value."35 The defendants had
not stated their opinion as to the worth of the equipment, but
had stated an actual price for which the equipment would sell.
The court suggested that, had they merely stated their opinion
as to the value of the camera, a subjective fact, their defense
might have been meritorious. Since they had stated an objective
fact, the market price of the equipment, and since such mis-
32. 303 F. Supp. at 752. The defendants' contention follows decisions such
as Byers v. Federal Land Co., 3 F2d 9 (8th Cir. 1924) and is supported by
5 S. WILLISToN, CoNTRACTs § 1493 (rev. ed. 1937) and RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 474 (1932).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964) makes it a crime for two or more persons "[tio
conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud
the United States... ," and has no relevancy to the subject of "puffing."
34. While not bearing on the problem of "puffing," it is interesting to note
that, when a purchase was made, the buyer received only one roll of film
along with the camera equipment; the other 599 rolls were sent one roll at a
time when the defendants returned a roll of developed film.
35. 303 F. Supp. at 753.
[V'ol. 22
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representation has been recognized as actionable fraud, such
defense was not a bar to their prosecution. 6
While defendant's contention did have some authoritative
basis,37 the cases now hold that it is not true that misrepresenta-
tions of value are never to be held actionable under section
1341.38 In United States v. Rowe,32 Judge Learned Hand, in
applying the mail fraud statute, said:
[Ihe law still recognizes that in bargaining parties
will puff their wares in terms which neither side means
seriously . . . but it is no longer law that declarations
of value can never be fraud. Values are facts as much
as anything else.
40
The court in MoNabb v. Thonas41 quoted the above Rowe
statement 42 and also said:
[Ain expression of opinion as to ... value . .. is
ordinarily held not to be actionable because it is not a
statement of fact. But "In a sense any assertion is a
statement of fact even though it only be an opinion.1
43
Thus it seems that, where the statement is a purely subjective
evaluation by the seller of the value of the article, such state-
ment is not actionable fraud. But, where the statements relate
the value to "external objective criteria," such as market price,
such statements may constitute actionable fraud.
44
In conjunction with consideration of the "puffing" argument,
the Hannigan court was faced with dealing with the defend-
ant's argument that, to sustain an action under section 1341, the
prosecution must prove that someone was actually defrauded.
4
5
36. Id. The court cites as the authority for this statement, 1 F. HARPER AND
F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.11 at 575 (1956). This section says that a
misstatement of a fixed or a previous price can be fraud and says that the
courts have looked to:
the relationship of the parties or their relative positions in regard
to knowledge, experience, opportunity to investigate and the like,
and have frequently held that these circumstances transformed the
statement of opinion into one of fact and formed the basis of an
exception to the general rule as to the non-actionability of state-
ments of opinion.
.37. See note 33 supra.
38. McNabb v. Thomas, 190 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United States v.
Rowe, 56 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1932).
39. 56 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1932).
40. Id. at 749.
41. 190 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
42. Id. at 610 n.7.
43. Id. at 610, quoting from Taylor v. Burr Printing Co., 26 F.2d 331, 334
(2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 641 (1928).
44. United States v. Hannigan, 303 F. Supp. 750, 753 (D. Conn. 1969).
45. Id. at 752.
1970]
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This contention is based on United States v. Bare48 which
added this as a third element to the two elements previously
mentioned in Gold as necessary for a section 1341 conviction.
The Baren requirement was subsequently described in United
States v. Andreadis47 as a "sui gene7s exception... to the
general rule that in prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 the
Government is not required to prove that individual purchasers
were actually defrauded." 48 It seems that the Baren court added
this third element mainly to convict the particular defendant
under the statute. In that case the product (a knitting machine)
could do most of what it was advertised to do, but it could not
completely live up to all of its advertised standards. 49 Since the
Government could present witnesses who had purchased the
machines because of these advertised standards and had later
found such representations to be untrue, it appears that the
court threw in this element to strengthen its decision to uphold
the defendant's conviction. Thus, it seems that, as a general
rule, as stated in Rowe prior to Baren and subsequently in
Andreadis and Hannigan, the Government need not prove nor
even allege that anyone was actually defrauded.
V. CONCLUSION
It seems as though the scope of the mail fraud statute is being
expanded by the courts in an effort to provide the "overcredu-
lous" members of the public even greater protection than in the
past. The courts are reluctant to add the element of requiring
proof of persons actually defrauded and are continuing to up-
hold convictions on the fraudulent nature of the scheme itself.
It is the attempt to defraud that is being prosecuted under
section 1341 rather than actual fraud. This seems proper since
the statute applies to those "having devised or intending to
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud"50 and does not spe-
cifically require proof of persons actually defrauded.
Courts are also expanding the scope of section 1341 by limit-
ing "puffing" in various ways, mainly by the changing of the
46. 305 F2d 527 (2d Cir. 1962).
47. 366 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
48. Id. at 431.
49. The statements concerned claimed, among other things, that a child could
operate the machine, which in fact he could not, and stated certain average
time periods in which certain things could be made, which time periods could
be met only by a dexterous, experienced operator of such machines. 305 F2d
527, 528 (2d Cir. 1962).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).
[Vrol. 22
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oft-stated rule that statements of value are always to be consid-
ered "puffing." Courts are now applying the subjective-objective
test; thus, if the statements of value are found to be objective,
based on market price or other "external objective criteria,"
they are no longer to be considered "puffing." "Puffing" is also
being limited in the sense that the courts are looking at the
allegedly fraudulent statements from the point of view of what
they convey to the public, not from what the seller claims to
have intended to convey or what they could possibly convey.
This is accomplished by looking at the relative positions of the
seller and the public to determine if the intended buyers must
rely on what the seller says or if they can make a judgment as
to the product's purported standards by other means.51
The application of the statute by the courts at the present
time as to "puffing" and actual actionable fraudulent repre-
sentations seems to be in accord with the proper balance which
the statute requires. Section "1341 must protect buyers, but
should not allow prosecution merely because a few buyers are
dissatisfied with a product. "Puffing" by a seller is expected by
the general public, and should not, and at this time is not,
actionable; however, where the seller oversteps the bounds of
"puffing," undefined though the limits may be, the statements
are and should be actionable under section 1341.
JoHN 0. HATEs
51. McNabb v. Thomas, 190 F2d 608, 610 (D.C Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 859 (1951).
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